Tanzanian Association Oslo

Why Tanzania has serious

problems with enterprise,

foreign investment?

THISDAY CORRESPONDENT 

Dar es Salaam 

EFFORTS should now be directed in Tanzania to explore the country’s psychic structure, since its ideas are now taking it to the pit of political and economic prospects. Psychic analysis as a wider instrument for comprehension of human psychic structure is a core of French structuralism, to use psychoanalysis to cover gaps of inadequate anchoring in philosophy. For instance no theory exists as to why there are different socio-political mentalities in the member states of the East African Community. Failure to bring up such a theory has made political science focus on leaders, for instance the differences between Nyerere, Obote and Kenyatta in failure to federate at independence as expected. 

Pursuing the analysis of what countries do in terms of what their leaders say or believe is an introvert manner of examining the issue, since these leaders are firstly a part of their communities before they become real, specific individuals with a particular outlook. They are affirmatively a part of this collective outlook and also stake out ’change’ in a specific manner, for instance in Uganda Dr Milton Obote sought to forge a sort of republic over a collection of kingdoms. Mzee Kenyatta on the other hand had first to contain the Mau Mau sentiment to put it to good use as enterprise, and rein back creeping feelings that the Kikuyu got a lion’s share of independence settlements. That wasn’t of course surprising. 

In Tanzania it hasn’t been sufficiently explained or elaborated that Mwalimu shifted from an Anglophile with Fabian social sentiments at heart, to a radical traditionalist rejecting enterprise and ownership structures on the land, as anti-colonialism here was one of values. The campaign against colonial authorities in the Maji Maji war was chiefly tied to cultural intrusion, with cotton farming less of exploitation than disturbing the way of life of coastal people, while taxes were a nuisance and an oppressive intervention. That way they had little use positive of missionary education and missionaries themselves, all of which became a part of political culture, with Arusha Declaration abolishing enterprise. 

The sort of political language that was experienced in Kenya, Tanzania or Uganda was a result of these pressures, with Tanzania marked by the preoccupation with ’development,’ itself arising from the poverty of enterprise at the local level, inability to build an infrastructure, since roads and communications paraphernalia follow the path of property, like farms, plantations, schools, etc. In Tanzania the level of property remained low throughout its independence epoch, and communalist sentiments of dependence ruled, in which case Tanzania is dependent to the government inwardly and on foreign donors outwardly, and both these spheres of dependence are entrenched in its political language. It is grossly concerned with removing ’exploitation’ internally and free supply of goods that are otherwise cheaply bought elsewhere (like basic medicine) and pursuit of an international economic order based on equity - that is, fair sharing of world wealth, since it detests wealth creators locally, depresses economic activity, and the aid it gets is never enough. 

That is why more can be learned in what Tanzania says about itself (in like manner as other countries) by the use of structural methods of analysis, which privilege unspoken intentions as more explanatory of language (including politics). It is better as an instrument than relying on the sort of reasons that national leaders set out as the foundation or basis of what they do at the level of economic policy or in engineering particular institutions. It is something that could be comprehended by the semiotics (language analysis) of neo-Lacanian analysis (using the arguments about lusts in the mind to explain ’rational’ positions set out by individuals) developed by Roland Barthes in the 1960s, though its use did not touch on most basics like analyzing the language of development. 

The use of words in ordinary language or politics reflects states of mind which also reflect hidden states of consciousness, fears, or wants. The key forms of consciousness are tied up with what sort of country people seek after or believe is necessary, and in Tanzania this outlook is chiefly the communal ownership of land, which has never become a subject of discussion either in academics or in politics. Tanzanians have a common religion in the public ownership of land, and that is why there is little dispute in relation to policy, to which is counterposed vast agitation in relation to results, where results are considered poor - and due to the basic underlying sentiment, the reason is narrowed down to corruption. 

Was Tanzania capable of comprehending the concept of enterprise, or ’rags to riches’ sort of microscopic notion of wealth creation, the whole country wouldn’t be united behind the idea that stealing of 133bn/- is the reason for encroaching poverty and penury on the part of large numbers of population. Large sections of society wouldn’t be pushing for space to advise President Jakaya Kikwete as to what to do with the cash that was reportedly returned, slated to be above 60bn/-, believing that if the cash was directed to that particular sector, that is its take off. It would be possible for Tanzanian elites to comprehend poverty from the basis of sectoral productivity linked to productivity of land as a whole, that for instance Kenya’s development level is tied up not with natural resources, but rather at least 10% of its land is privately owned, and thus it becomes the powerhouse of credit. Zimbabwe used to be so. 

Thus the whole process of political language in the past 47 years as it relates to ’development’ is a form of drama, arising from the sacred communal ties to land, its crushing of bank credit and inability to put up enterprises in farming or industry at most levels, save by the agency of foreign investors whose activities thus form the premise for other services to come up. All this is easy to bring out in terms of economic analysis, but that kind of orientation cannot arise because of wisdom of educational institutions and syllabuses, where the thinking that wealth in the country reflects how wealth is shared in the world is sunk deep. 

When politics and language are examined or that way this demonstrates the highs and lows of this development language, for instance the Arusha Declaration as a particularly interesting bit of drama, where millions of people were enveloped in total ecstasy in relation to the good times resulting from nationalization of foreign banks, farms, etc. Little did they realize that this was in preparation for large scale poverty, and being overtaken by all countries with whom we could compare, and that this situation is durable, almost permanent. Tanzania for instance had about five girls in secondary school on average (out of 100) while Kenya had more than 40 and Uganda above 25; Tanzania compared with war-ridden Afghanistan, and only just close to Niger with eight girls per 100. 

Surprisingly enough, the drama of the Arusha Declaration, which in 1967 was imposed by Mwalimu Nyerere on Parliament knowing that it would be profoundly popular and clearly workable because the Keynesian methods of state credit to build industry were in vogue at that time, is about to be repeated. This time the pressure comes from below, not imposed on Parliament but on the president by parliamentary pressure, reinforced by people ’taking action’ in their thousands, for instance what happened in North Mara gold mine lately. That sort of mood is fully incompatible with foreign investment, but it has been taken in good stride or expectation that more shall come of it, since Tanzania’s media, NGOs and most of the priesthood believe that partial nationalization of mining sector interests is the best the country can do now, without saying explicitly that they don’t want mining firms; 10 years is enough.