Few changes since a new president took office a year ago

Mar 22nd 2007
From the Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire

Just over a year ago, Jakaya Kikwete won a landslide victory in the presidential poll, securing more than 80% of the popular vote. Tanzanians were clearly optimistic that the dynamism of Mr Kikwete's campaign would be translated into government, and that the new administration would be capable of pushing ahead with an ambitious reform agenda on multiple fronts. Unfortunately, the reality is rather different, with the government beset by corruption allegations and bogged down in a seemingly never-ending power crisis. In fact, it has arguably become a mirror image of Benjamin Mkapa's administration, which, while capable, was hardly inspiring.

To be fair, many of the problems experienced since Mr Kikwete's election—such as the power crisis in 2006—were inherited from the Mkapa government, while the new president stresses that his tenure should be judged over the full five-year term rather than his first 12 months in office. He also clearly has a plan in this respect. For the 2005 election the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) drew up a very detailed manifesto, even detailing individual projects to which it is committed. To try to ensure that this goal is met ministries will now undergo annual evaluations to see which of the schemes have been implemented as part of the annual budget cycle. The aim, presumably, is to enable the president to state that he has delivered on his political promises by giving the electorate precise details on the implementation of projects outlined in the CCM manifesto.

However, there are problems with this approach, which in some ways can be seen as hiding behind manifesto commitments. The real constraint to development in Tanzania is not finding schemes, nor even their financing and implementation. In fact, this route for re-election perpetuates the current mentality of the government: its role is to administer a series of projects. Instead, the real problem constraining development is the lack of a dynamic administration able to start to solve the many complex and interlinked constraints facing the country. This is still far from being resolved and is unlikely to be so without a change in the way Tanzania's political leadership regards the role of government.

In addition, this approach blurs the line between the ruling CCM and the government/civil service, while raising doubts as to whether the CCM manifesto or the five-year national development strategy (mainly referred to by its Swahili acronym, MKUKUTA) has higher priority. Although the two are clearly closely linked, the manifesto arguably has more politically orientated projects and did not involve the wider consultations involved in drawing up MKUKUTA. In addition, the manifesto is clearly a less ambitious document than MKUKUTA. As such, the priority should be the implementation of the development strategy, but this does not seem to be the case.

Another problem with the Kikwete presidency may be more fundamental. During his first year in office all the major decisions appear to have been made by the president himself. Mr Kikwete and the first lady are clearly the centre of attention and the locus of political power. The vice-president, who was not selected as a running mate by Mr Kikwete, has been sidelined, while the prime minister, Edward Lowassa, appears loyal but not particularly dynamic.

This centralisation of power does not necessarily have to be a problem—it is arguably common in many African countries—but it has become one because of the substantial amount of time the president has spent abroad in his first year in office. He claims this is necessary in order to raise the profile of the country and to attract foreign investment, but the rest of the government seems unable to make important decisions in his absence. There is a flurry of activity whenever the president returns from a foreign visit, but this quickly dies away with his next trip, and on his return the focus of attention has moved on and there is little follow-up with respect to implementation.

In one sense this isn't crucially important. The Economist Intelligence Unit expects growth to be robust at around 6-7% in 2007, and inflation relatively low, thanks to the end of the power crisis in early 2007, good rains, high commodity prices, a stable macroeconomic environment and large donor inflows. However, it does mean that the government is unlikely to get to grips with the challenges need to turn Tanzania into an economy with a growth rate of between 7-10% a year—the level required to make sustained inroads into high levels of poverty in the country.

Source: http://economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8892443